

Message Text

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ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ACDA-10 OES-02 EUR-08 CIAE-00
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R 081445Z APR 77
FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8318
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 2841

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, IAEA, PARM
SUBJECT: IAEA STAFFING IN DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS

REF: (A) STATE 71683; (B) MOSCOW 4361

SUMMARY: MESSAGE REPORTS CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR
EROFEEV ON STAFFING IAEA DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS. END
SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING EARLIER AGREEMENT THAT WE MEET AFTER CONCLUSION
UNIDO MEETINGS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR EROFEEV CALLED ON ME
AFTERNOON APRIL 6. MEETING, WHICH LASTED ONE AND A HALF
HOURS, DEALT PRIMARILY WITH STAFFING IN IAEA DEPARTMENT OF
SAFEGUARDS.

2. EROFEEV BEGAN BY ALLUDING TO CONVERSATION BETWEEN EMBASSY
MOSCOW AND PROFESSOR MOROKHOV AND I INFORMED HIM I WAS AWARE
OF THIS CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL B. AFTER BRIEF EXCHANGE,
I TOLD EROFEEV THAT WHILE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MIGHT NOT SEE
EYE TO EYE ON A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES, I WAS SATISFIED THAT
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OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA'S SAFEGAURDS
COINCIDED AND THAT I BELIEVED IT WAS IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS
OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS OF THE
IAEA FUNCTION AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. TO ASSURE SUCH EF-
FECTIVE FUNCTIONING, I FELT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN IT WAS
IMPORTANT FOR US BOTH TO SUPPORT THE BEST POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR
KEY POSITIONS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT, GIVING SECONDARY CONSIDER-

ATION TO THEIR PARTICULAR NATIONALITIES. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT WE HAD SUPPORTED THE SOVIET NOMINATION OF SHMELEV TO BE HEAD OF THE NEW DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION TREATMENT.

3. I REMINDED EROFEEV THAT THEIR SUPPORT OF SKJOELDEBRAND AT THE TIME THAT WE WERE SUPPORTING THORSTENSEN FOR THE POST OF DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF OPERATIONS B HAD MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE DG TO SELECT THE THIRD CANDIDATE HAGINOYA, A DEVELOPMENT THAT, IN OUR VIEW, WAS NEITHER IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION NOR OF THE US. I THEREFORE FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW SEEK TO AGREE UPON COMMON CANDIDATES AND THAT THE TWO OF US SHOULD JOINTLY ADVISE THE DG OF OUR PREFERRED CANDIDATES FOR UPCOMING KEY POSITIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

4. THIS LED ME TO INDICATE THAT, IN OUR JUDGMENT AND BASED ON CLOSE OBSERVATION OF HIS PERFORMANCE OVER SEVERAL YEARS, WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ONE OF THE MOST OUTSTANDING MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS WAS THORSTENSEN, WHO HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS INTEREST IN ASSURING EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION BY THE AGENCY AS WELL AS A CAPACITY TO LEAD AND EVEN INSPIRE INSPECTORS IN HIS SECTION. FURTHERMORE, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WAS THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE OF DDG ROMETSCH FOR THE POST OF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS A. I ADDED THAT OUR INFORMATION WAS THAT MORALE IN THE DEPARTMENT WAS LOW, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE LENGTHY DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW REORGANIZATION PLAN, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THOSE INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHO HAD WORKED HARD FOR EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY RECOGNITION FOR THEIR EFFORTS. IT WAS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE WERE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONVINCED THE APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE AS SUCCESSOR TO NAKICENOVIC SHOULD BE THORSTENSEN AND I ASKED THAT HE EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINING WITH US IN SUPPORT OF HIS CANDIDACY.

5. EROFEEV EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MY INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THAT WE JOINTLY SEEK TO IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT CANDIDATES FOR KEY POSITIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS. HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE TIME HAS COME WHEN WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO THIS END. HE ACCEPTED THAT THORSTENSEN WAS WELL QUALIFIED AND HAD MADE A VERY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENT.

6. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO RECOUNT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO TO IDENTIFY THE MOST WELL-QUALIFIED CANDIDATES FROM AMONG ALL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES FOR THE POSITION AS SUCCESSOR TO NAKICENOVIC. AFTER EXHAUSTIVE EFFORTS AND ELIMINATING A NUMBER OF OTHER APPARENTLY WELL-QUALIFIED CANDIDATES, THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE CZECH, BARABAS, WAS IDEALLY QUALIFIED. BARABAS HAD THE TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AND

WAS SOLID AND COULD BE THOROUGHLY RELIED UPON NOT TO DEVIATE FROM THE LINE THAT BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS WISH TO SEE FOLLOWED.

7. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS CONCERNED AT THE FACT THAT BARABAS WOULD BE COMING FROM OUTSIDE THE AGENCY AND, LIKE HAGINOYA, WOULD INEVITABLY REQUIRE AT LEAST SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR TO ADJUST TO THE AGENCY ENVIRONMENT AND TO BECOME EFFECTIVE IN HIS JOB. FURTHER, I BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE SELECTED FOR THIS POST SHOULD BE AN OUTSTANDING MANAGER AND ADMINISTRATOR AND EVEN AN INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD PROVIDE INSPIRED LEADERSHIP TO THE GROUP OF INSPECTORS THAT WOULD BE WORKING FOR HIM. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE SATISFIED THAT THORSTENSEN POSSESSED THESE QUALITIES WHICH WE THOUGHT WERE SO ESSENTIAL. EROFEEV REPLIED THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY SATISFIED THAT BARABAS WOULD FULLY MEASURE UP IN EVERY RESPECT AND THAT HE HAD BEEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CZECH ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT AND HAD THUS BEEN SUPERVISING SOME THOUSANDS OF
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SCIENTIFICALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

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FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 2841

LIMDIS

8. AFTER SEVERAL FURTHER EXCHANGES SUPPORTING OUR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES, EROFEEV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TTHORSTENSEN ON

TWO GROUNDS. FIRST, HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD HE WAS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS INCLINED TO QUOTE GO HIS OWN WAY UNQUOTE, TO WHICH I REJOINED THAT, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, HIS EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD HAD ALWAYS BEEN IN THE DIRECTION OF ATTEMPTING TO ASSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AGENCY SAFEGUARDS AND, SECONDLY, HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THORSTENSEN AND THE DG. I REBUTTED THIS LATTER POINT BY POINTING OUT TO HIM THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE OCCUPANT OF THE DIRECTOR LEVEL POST TO WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH DDG ROMETSCH THAN WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL HIMSELF. FYI: MISSION HAS NO RPT NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EROFEEV CONTENTION ON THIS POINT. END FYI.

9. I URGED EROFEEV TO REPORT MY PROPOSAL TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO URGE THEM TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR JOINTLY SUPPORTING THORSTENSEN'S CANDIDACY FOR THE REMAINING DIRECTOR LEVEL POST IN OPERATIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD DO SO, BUT IMMEDIATELY ADDED THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD COME SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD OF SUPPORTING BARABAS THAT IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY COULD CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

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10. AT THAT POINT, EROFEEV PROPOSED WE NOMINATE HOUGH FOR THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE EVALUATION GROUP; AND HE SPOKE WARMLY OF THE ESTEEM IN WHICH SHMELEV HOLDS HOUGH. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT THAT WE WERE AWARE THAT HOUGH HAD VOICED RESERVATION ABOUT ACCEPTING THAT POSITION.

11. EROFEEV THEN SAID THAT HIS QUOTE SECRET THOUGHT UNQUOTE WAS THAT THE TWO OF US SHOULD JOINTLY CALL ON THE DG AND INFORM HIM THAT THE TERM OF HAGINOYA SHOULD BE CONFINED TO TWO YEARS. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THE DG MIGHT HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THIS IF, AS I EXPECTED, HAGINOYA PERFORMED REASONABLY SATISFACTORILY EVEN THOUGH NOT AS EFFECTIVELY AS HE OR I MIGHT HOPE. IT COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE DG TO EXPLAIN TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR WHY HAGINOYA COULD NOT BE EXTENDED. TO THIS, EROFEEV REJOINED QUOTE WHY UNQUOTE, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE TWO OF US JOINTLY APPROACHED THE DG, THE DG WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO COMPLY WITH OUR REQUEST.

12. SUBSEQUENTLY, EROFEEV SUGGESTED THAT THORSTENSEN MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE EVALUATION GROUP, TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT I BELIEVED THORSTENSEN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY BETTER QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN A LINE, RATHER THAN, IN A STAFF CAPACITY.

13. SINCE IT WAS CLEAR WE WERE UNABLE TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT ON SUPPORT OF A SPECIFIC CANDIDATE, I SUGGESTED TO EROFEEV THAT WE MIGHT REPORT TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AND SUGGEST THE MATTER BE REFERRED TO AMBASSADOR TAPE AND PROFESSOR

MOROKHOV. EROFEEV SAID HE WOULD INDEED REPORT THE CONVERSATION, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR OUR TWO GOVERNORS TO MEET. I ASKED IF PROFESSOR MOROKHOV WOULD BE IN SALZBURG, TO WHICH EROFEEV REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT. FYI: WE UNDERSTAND MOROKHOV IS SCHEDULED TO CHAIR A ROUND-TABLE SESSION ON SAFEGUARDS AT SALZBURG CONFERENCE. END FYI. HOWEVER, HE DID EXPECT MOROKHOV TO ATTEND THE NEXT SUPPLIERS GROUP
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MEETING, WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE MAY AND WHICH I UNDERSTOOD TO BE IN LATE APRIL. WE AGREED IT WOULD BE BEST FOR FURTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNORS TO TAKE PLACE THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, WHICH COULD BE IN TOUCH WITH PROFESSOR MOROKHOV.

14. COMMENT: I CONCLUDE FROM THIS MEETING THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO MOVE THE SOVIETS AWAY FROM THEIR SUPPORT FOR BARABAS, BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE WELL WORTH AT LEAST ONE MORE ATTEMPT BY WAY OF A MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR TAPE TO PROFESSOR MOROKHOV FOR TACTICAL REASONS IF NO OTHER. END COMMENT.

15. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH DDG ROMETSCH, HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD LEARNED (THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH CZECH STAFF MEMBERS--PROTEXT) THAT BARABAS WAS WELL QUALIFIED TECHNICALLY, BUT HAD HAD ABSOLUTELY NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH SAFEGUARDS. I BELIEVED THIS POINT IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE COVERED IN A TAPE-MOROKHOV MESSAGE.

16. DDG ROMETSCH HAS NOW GIVEN HOUGH ASSIGNMENT OF PREPARING TERMS OF REFERENCE OF CHIEF OF EVALUATION GROUP IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAKE THE POSITION ATTRACTIVE TO HIM. LATEST INDICATIONS ARE THAT HOUGH IS NOW MORE RECEPTIVE TO THIS POSSIBILITY.

17. I PLAN TO CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL A AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING RETURN DG EKLUND APRIL 15 FROM HIS CURRENT VISIT TO EGYPT AND IRAN. I ALSO PLAN TO ADVISE EROFEEV OF MY CALL ON EKLUND IN SUPPORT OF THORSTENSEN. I RECOMMEND TAPE-MOROKHOV MESSAGE BE SENT PRIOR TO APRIL 15 IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

18. WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE EMBASSY PRAGUE PROVIDING BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON BARABAS.STONE

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Message Attributes

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